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INTRODUCTION
Economic theorists traditionally banish discussions of infor-
mation to footnotes. Serious consideration of costs of communication,
imperfect knowledge, and the like would, it is believed, complicate
without informing. This paper, which analyzes competitive markets
in which the characteristics of the commodities exchanged are not
fully known to at least one of the parties to the transaction, suggests
that this comforting myth is false. Some of the most important con-
clusions of economic theory are not robust to considerations of im-
perfect information.
We are able to show that not only may a competitive equilibrium
not exist, but when equilibria do exist, they may have strange prop-
erties. In the insurance market, upon which we focus much of our
discussion, sales offers, at least those that survive the competitive
process, do not specify a price at which customers can buy all the in-
surance, they want, but instead consist of both a price and a quan-
tity—a particular amount of insurance that the individual can buy
at tbat price. Furthermore, if individuals were willing or able to reveal
their information, everybody could be made better off. By their very
being, high-risk individuals cause an externality: tbe low-risk indi-
viduals are worse off than they would be in the absence of the high-risk
individuals. However, the high-risk individuals are no better off than
they would be in the absence of the low-risk individuals.
These points are made in the next section by analysis of a simple
model of a competitive insurance market. We believe that the lessons
gleaned from our highly stylized model are of general interest, and
attempt to establish this by showing in Section II that our model is
robust and by hinting (space constraints prevent more) in the con-
clusion that our analysis applies to many other situations. i
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I. THE BASIC MODEL
Most of our argument can be made by analysis of a very simple
example. Consider an individual who will have an income of size W
if be is lucky enough to avoid accident. In the event an accident occurs,
his income will be only W - d. Tbe individual can insure himself
against this accident by paying to an insurance company a premium
tfi, in return for whicb he will be paid fV2 if an accident occurs. Without
insurance bis income in the two states, "accident," "no accident," was
iW, W —d); with insurance it is now (Vy — ai,W — d + 0:2), where 02
= tt2 ~ «i. The vector a = iai, 0:2) completely describes the insurance
contract.^
7.7 Demand for Insurance Contracts
On an insurance market, insurance contracts (the a's) are traded.
To describe how the market works, it is necessary to describe the
supply and demand functions of the participants in the market. There
are only two kinds of participants, individuals who buy insurance and
companies that sell it. Determining individual demand for insurance
contracts is straightforward. An individual purchases an insurance
contract so as to alter his pattern of income across states of nature.
Let Wi denote his income if there is no accident and W2 his income
if an accident occurs; tbe expected utility theorem states that under
relatively mild assumptions his preferences for income in these two
states of nature are described by a function of the form,
(1) 9ip, Wu W2) = a -p)UiWi) + pUiW2),
where Ui ) represents the utility of money income^ and p the
probability of an accident. Individual demands may be derived from
(D.A contract a is worth V(p, a) = 9ip, W - ai, W -d + 02). From
1. Actual insurance contracts are more complicated because a single contract will
offer coverage against many potential losses. A formal generalization of the scheme
above to cover this case is straightforward. Suppose that an individual will, in the ab-
sence of insurance, have an income of W, if state ( occurs. An insurance contract is
simply an f!-tuple (01,.. . ,«„) whose i-th coordinate describes the net payment of the
individual to the insurance company if state i occurs. We confine our discussion to the
simple case mentioned in the text, although it could be trivially extended to this more
complicated case.
Many insurance contracts are not as complicated as the n-tuples described
above--BIue Cross schedules listing maximum payments for specific illnesses and
operations are an isolated example—but are instead resolvable into a fixed premium
and a payment schedule that is in general a simple function of the size of the loss such
as F{L} = Max [0, c{L-D)], where c X 100% is the co-insurance rate and D is the de-
ductible. With such a contract when a loss occurs, determining its size is often a serious
problem. In other words, finding out exactly what state of the world has occurred is
not always easy. We ignore these problems. A large literature analyzes optimal insurance
contracts. See, for example. Arrow (1971) and Borch (1968).
2. We assume that preferences are not state-dependent.
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all the contracts the individual is offered, he chooses the one that
maximizes Vip, a). Since he always bas tbe option of buying no in-
surance, an individual will purchase a contract a only if Vip, a) >
Vip, 0) = 9{p, W, W — d). We assume that persons are identical in
all respects save their probability of having an accident and that they
are risk-averse iU" < 0); thus V{p, a) is quasi-concave.
7.2 Supply of Insurance Contracts
It is less straightforward to describe how insurance companies
decide which contracts they should offer for sale and to which people.
The return from an insurance contract is a random variable. We as-
sume that companies are risk-neutral, that they are concerned only
with expected profits, so that contract « when sold to an individual
who has a probability of incurring an accident of p, is worth
(2) Trip, a) = (1 - p)ai - pa-z = ai - pia\ + a2).
Even if firms are not expected profit maximizers, on a well-organized
competitive market tbey are likely to behave as if they maximized
(2).''
Insurance companies have financial resources such that they are
willing and able to sell any number of contracts that they think will
make an expected profit.^ The market is competitive in that there is
free entry. Together these assumptions guarantee that any contract
that is demanded and that is expected to be profitable will be sup-
plied.
3. Since the theory of the firm behavior under uncertainty is one of the more
unsettled areasof economic theory, we cannot look to it for the sort of support of any
assumption we might make, which the large body of literature devoted to the expected
utility theorem provides for equation (1) above. Nonetheless, two arguments (and the
absence of a remotely as attractive distinguishable alternative) justify (2): the first is
the rather vaguely supported but widely held proposition that companies owned by
stockholders who themselves hold diversified portfolios ought to maximize their ex-
pected profits; management that does not follow this policy will be displaced. The
second supposes that insurance companies are held by a large number of small share-
holders each of whom receives a small share of the firm's profits. If the risks insured
against are independent or otherwise diversifiabie, then the law of large numbers
guarantees that each shareholder's return will be approximately constant and any in-
dividual insurance contract contributes to his profits only through its expected value.
In this case stockholders' interests will be well served if, and only if, management
maximizes expected profits.
A variant of the second argument is obtained by considering the case in which
shareholders and policyholders are the same people, or in more familiar terms, when
the insurance company is a mutual company. In this case the insurance company isjust a mechanism for risk pooling. Under conditions where diversification is possible,
each contract's contribution to the company's dividend (or loss) is proportional to its
expected value.
4. The same kinds of arguments uaed to justify (2)—in particular the appeal to
the law of large numbers^can be used to justify this assumption. Weaker conditions
than independence will suffice. See Revesz (1960), p. 190, for a theorem that states
roughly that, if insurance contracts can be arranged in space so that even though con-
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1.3 Information about Accident Probabilities
We have not so far discussed how customers and companies come
to know or estimate the parameter p, which plays sucb a crucial role
in the valuation formulae (1) and (2). We make the bald assumption
that individuals know their accident probabilities, while companies
do not. Since insurance purchasers are identical in all respects save
their propensity to have accidents, the force of this assumption is that
companies cannot discriminate among their potential customers on
the basis of their characteristics. This assumption is defended and
modified in subsection II.1.
A firm may use its customers' market behavior to make infer-
ences about their accident probabilities. Other things equal, those with
high accident probabilities will demand more insurance than those
who are less accident-prone. Although possibly accurate, this is not
a profitable way of finding out about customer characteristics. In-
surance companies want to know their customers' characteristics in
order to decide on wbat terms they sbould offer to let tbem buy in-
surance. Information that accrues after purchase may be used only
to lock the barn after the horse has been stolen.
It is often possible to force customers to make market choices in
such a way that they both reveal tbeir characteristics and make the
choices the firm would have wanted them to make had their charac-
teristics been publicly known. In tbeir contribution to this symposium,
Salop and Salop call a market device with tbese characteristics a
self-selection mechanism. Analysis of the functioning of self-selection
mechanisms on competitive markets is a major focus of this paper.
1.4 Definition of Equilibrium
We assume that customers can buy only one insurance contract.
This is an objectionable assumption. It implies, in effect, that the seller
of insurance specifies both the prices and quantities of insurance
purchased. In most competitive markets, sellers determine only price
and have no control over the amount their customers buy. Nonethe-
less, we believe that wbat we call price and quantity competition is
more appropriate for our model of the insurance market tban tradi-
tracts that are close to one another are not independent, those that are far apart are
approximately independent, then the average return from all contracts is equal to its
expected value witb probability one. Thus, an insurance company that holds a large
nuniber of health policies should be risk-neutral, even though the fact that propinquity
carries illness implies that not all insured risks are independent. Some risks that cannot
be diversified; i.e., the risk of nuclear war (or of a flood or a plague) cannot be .spread
by appeal to the law of large numbers. Our model applies to diversifiable risks. This
class of risks is considerably larger than the independent ones.
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tional price competition. We defend this proposition at length in
subsection II.2 below.
Equilibrium in a competitive insurance market is a set of con-
tracts such tbat, when customers choose contracts to maximize ex-
pected utility, (i) no contract in tbe equilibrium set makes negative
expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium
set that, if offered, will make a nonnegative profit. This notion of
equilibrium is of the Cournot-Nash type; each firm assumes that the
contracts its competitors offer are independent of its own actions.
1.5 Equilibrium with Identical Customers
Only when customers have different accident probabilities, will
insurance companies have imperfect information. We examine tbis
case below. To illustrate our, mainly graphical, procedure, we first




In Figure I the horizontal and vertical axes represent income in
5. The analysis is identical if individuals have different p's, but companies know
the accident probabilities of their customers. The market splits into several sub-
markets^one for each different p represented. Each submarket has the equilibrium
described here.
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the states: no accident, accident, respectively. The point E with
coordinates iW], W2) is the typical customer's uninsured state. In-
difference curves are level sets of the function of equation (1). Pur-
chasing the insurance policy a = («], ^ 2) moves tbe individual from
E to the point iWi - au W2 + 02).
Free entry and perfect competition will ensure tbat policies
bought in competitive equilibrium make zero expected profits, so tbat
if «is purchased,
(3) ai(l-p)-a2P=0.
The set of all policies that break even is given analytically by (3) and
diagrammatically by the line EF in Figure I, wbich is sometimes re-
ferred to as the fair-odds line. The equilibrium policy a*maximizes
the individual's (expected) utility and just breaks even. Purchasing
a* locates the customer at tbe tangency of tbe indifference curve with
the fair-odds line, a* satisfies the two conditions of equilibrium: (i)
it breaks even; (ii) selling any contract preferred to it will bring in-
surance companies expected losses.
Since customers are risk-averse, the point a* is located at the
intersection of the 45°-line (representing equal income in both states
of nature) and the fair-odds line. In equilibrium each customer buys
complete insurance at actuarial odds. To see this, observe that the
slope of tbe fair-odds line is equal to the ratio of the probability of not
having an accident to the probability of having an accident ((1 —
p)/p), while the slope of tbe indifference curve (the marginal rate of
substitution between income in the state no accident to income in the
state accident) is [U'iW^) (7 - p)y[U'iW2)p], which, when income
in the two states is equal, is (1 - p)/p, independent of U.
1.6 Imperfect Information: Equilibrium with Two Classes of
Customers
Suppose that the market consists of two kinds of customers:
low-risk individuals with accident probability p^^ and high-risk in-
dividuals witb accident probability p'^ > p^. The fraction of high-risk
customers is X, so the average accident probability is p = \p^ + (1
- X)p '^. This market can have only two kinds of equilibria: pooling
equilibria in which both groups buy the same contract, and separating
equilibria in wbich different types purchase different contracts.
A simple argument establishes that there cannot be a pooling
equilibrium. Tbe point E in Figure II is again tbe initial endowment
of all customers. Suppose that«is a pooling equilibrium and consider
Trip, a). If 7r(p, «) < 0, then firms offering a lose money, contradicting
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FIGURE II
the definition of equilibrium. If irip, a) > 0, then there is a contract
that offers slightly more consumption in each state of nature, which
still will make a profit when all individuals buy it. All will prefer this
contract to a, so a cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, 7r(p, a) =0, and
« lies on the market odds line EF (with slope (1 — p)/p).
It follows from (1) that at a the slope of the high-risk indifference
curve through a, U^, is (p^/1 — p'^) (1 — p^'/p^) times the slope of
U^, the low-risk indifference curve through a. In this figure (7^ is a
broken line, and 0^ a solid line. Tbe curves intersect at«; thus there
is a contract, i3 in Figure II, near a, wbich low-risk types prefer to a.
The high risk prefer a to 0. Since 0 is near a, it makes a profit when
the less risky buy it, (x(p'-, 0) ^ 7r(p'-, cy) > irip, a) = 0). The exis-
tence of 0 contradicts the second part of the definition of equilibrium;
a cannot be an equilibrium.
If there is an equilibrium, each type must purchase a separate
contract. Arguments, wbich are, we hope, by now familiar, demon-
strate that each contract in the equilibrium set makes zero profits.
In Figure III the low-risk contract lies on line EL (with slope (1 —
p'-)/p'-), and the high-risk contract on line EH (witb slope (1 —
p'^)/p^). As was sbown in tbe previous subsection, tbe contract on
EH most preferred by high-risk customers gives complete insurance.
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H
FIGURE III
This is a ' ' in Figure III; it must be part of any equilibrium. Low-risk
customers would, of all contracts on EL, most prefer contract 0 which,
like a^', provides complete insurance. However, 0 offers more con-
sumption in each state tban a^, and bigh-risk types will prefer it to
a^. If 0 and a^ are marketed, botb high- and low-risk types will
purchase 0. The nature of imperfect information in this model is that
insurance companies are unable to distinguish among their customers.
AU wbo demand 0 must be sold 0. Profits will be negative; (a", 0) is
not an equilibrium set of contracts.
An equilibrium contract for low-risk types must not be more
attractive to high-risk types than a'^; it must lie on the southeast side
of U^, tbe high-risk indifference curve through a^. We leave it to the
reader to demonstrate that of all such contracts, the one that low-risk
types most prefer is a '^, the contract at the intersection of EL and U'^
in Figure III. This establishes that the set («^, o-^ ) is the only possible
equilibrium for a market with low- and high-risk customers.^ How-
ever, (a^, a^') may not be an equilibrium. Consider tbe contract 7 in
Figure III. It lies above U^, tbe low-risk indifference curve through
a^ and also above U^. If 7 is offered, both low- and high-risk types
6. This largely heuristic argument can be made completely rigorous. See Wilson(1976).
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will purchase it in preference to either a^ or a^. If it makes a profit
when both groups buy it, 7 will upset the potential equilibrium of {a^,
a^). 7's profitability depends on the composition of the market. If
there are sufficiently many bigh-risk people that EF represents
market odds, then 7 will lose money. If market odds are given by EF'
(as they will be if there are relatively few higb-risk insurance cus-
tomers), then 7 will make a profit. Since (a^^, a') is tbe only possible
equilibrium, in this case the competitive insurance market will have
no equilibrium.
This establisbes that a competitive insurance market may have
no equilibrium. , |
We have not found a simple intuitive explanation for tbis non-
existence; but tbe following observations, prompted by Frank Hahn's
note (1974), may be suggestive. The information that is revealed by
an individual's choice of an insurance contract depends on all tbe
other insurance policies offered; tbere is thus a fundamental infor-
mational externality tbat each company, when deciding on which
contract it will offer, fails to take into account. Given any set of con-
tracts that breaks even, a firm may enter tbe market using the infor-
mational structure implicit in the availability of that set of contracts
to make a profit; at the same time it forces the original contracts to
make a loss. But as in any Nash equilibrium, tbe firm fails to take
account of tbe consequences of its actions, and in particular, the fact
that when those policies are no longer offered, the informational
structure will have changed and it can no longer make a profit.
We can characterize the conditions under which an equilibrium
does not exist. An equilibrium will not exist if the costs to the low-risk
individual of pooling are low (because there are relatively few of tbe
high-risk individuals who bave to be subsidized, or because tbe
subsidy per individual is low, i.e., wben the probabilities of the two
groups are not too different), or if their costs of separating are high.
Tbe costs of separating arise from the individual's inability to obtain
complete insurance. Thus, tbe costs of separating are related to the
individuals' attitudes toward risk. Certain polar cases make these
propositions clear. If p^ = 0, it never pays tbe low-risk individuals
to pool, and by continuity, for sufficiently small p'- it does not pay
to p(X)l. Similarly, if individuals are risk-neutral, it never pays to pool;
if they are infinitely risk averse with utility functions
(!') V(p, Wi, W2) = Min iWu W2),
it always pays to pool.
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1.7 Welfare Economics of Equilibrium
One of tbe interesting properties of the equilibrium is that the
presence of the higb-risk individuals exerts a negative externality on
the low-risk individuals. The externality is completely dissipative;
there are losses to the low-risk individuals, but the high-risk indi-
viduals are no better off tban they would be in isolation.
If only the bigh-risk individuals would admit to tbeir having high
accident probabilities, all individuals would be made better off
without anyone being worse off.
Tbe separating equilibrium we have described may not be Pareto
optimal even relative to the information that is available. As we show
in subsection II.3 below, there may exist a pair of policies tbat break
even together and tbat make both groups better off.
II. ROBUSTNESS
The analysis of Section I had three principal conclusions: First,
competition on markets with imperfect information is more complex
than in standard models. Perfect competitors may limit the quantities
their customers can buy, not from any desire to exploit monopoly
power, but simply in order to improve tbeir information. Second,
equilibrium may not exist. Finally, competitive equilibria are not
Pareto optimal. It is natural to ask wbether these conclusions (par-
ticularly the first, which was an assumption rather than a result of the
analysis) can be laid to the special and possibly strained assumptions
of our model. We think not. Our conclusions (or ones very like) must
follow from a serious attempt to comprehend tbe workings of com-
petition with imperfect and asymmetric information. We bave ana-
lyzed tbe effect of cbanging our model in many ways. The results were
always essentially the same.
Our attempts to establisb robustness took two tacks. First, we
sbowed that our results did not depend on the simple technical
specifications of tbe model. This was tedious, and we bave excised
most of the details from the present version. Tbe reader interested
in analysis of the effects (distinctly minor) of cbanging our assump-
tions that individuals are alike in all respects save tbeir accident
probabilities, that there are only two kinds of customers, and tbat tbe
insurance market lasts but a single period, is referred to earlier ver-
sions of this paper.'' An assessment of the importance of tbe as-
7. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975). One curious result of these investigations
should be mentioned. In other areas of economic theory where existence of equilihrium
has been a problem, smoothing things by introducing a continuum of individuals of
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sumption that individuals know tbeir accident probabilities, while
insurance companies do not (wbich raises more interesting issues),
is given in subsection II. 1 below.
Another approach to the question of robustness is tbe subject
of the next three subsections. In them we question the behavioral
assumptions and the equilibrium concepts used in Section I.
//./ Information Assumptions
Suppose tbat there are two groups of customers and tbat not all
individuals within each group have tbe same accident probability. Tbe
average accident probability of one group is greater than tbat of the
other; individuals within each group know the mean accident prob-
ability for members of tbeir group, but do not know tbeir own accident
probabilities. As before, the insurance company cannot tell directly
the accident probability of any particular individual, or even tbe group
to which be belongs. For example, suppose that some persons occa-
sionally drink too much, while the others almost never drink. Insur-
ance firms cannot discover who drinks and who does not. Individuals
know that drinking affects accident probabilities, but it affects dif-
ferent people differently. Each individual does not know how it will
affect him.
In such a situation tbe expected utility theorem states that in-
dividuals make (and behave according to) estimates of their accident
probabilities; if these estimates are unbiased in the sense that the
average accident probability of tbose who estimate tbeir accident
probability to be p actually is p, then the analysis goes through as
before.
Unbiasedness seems a reasonable assumption (wbat is a more
attractive alternative?). However, not even tbis low level of correctness
of beliefs is required for our conclusions. Suppose, for example, tbat
individuals differ both with respect to tbeir accident probabilities and
to their risk aversion, but they all assume tbat their own accident
probabilities are p. If low-risk individuals are less risk-averse on av-
erage, then there will not exist a pooling equilibrium; there may exist
no equilibrium at all; and if there does exist an equilibrium, it will
entail partial insurance for both groups. Figure IV shows tbat there
dilterent types can Insure existence. Not so here. If there is a continuous distribution
of accident probabilities (but customers are otherwise identical), then equilibrium never
exists. There is an intuitive explanation for this striking result. We argued above that,
if accident probabilities were close together, then equilibrium would not exist. When
there is a continuum of probabilities, there always are individuals with close proba-
bilities witb whom It pays to "pool." For a proof of this result, which is not elementary.
see Riley (1976).
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will not exist a pooling equilibrium. If there were a pooling equilib-
rium, it would clearly be with complete insurance at the market odds,
since both groups' indifference curves have the slope of tbe market
odds line there. If the low-risk individuals are less risk-averse, then
the two indifference curves are tangent at F, but elsewhere tbe
high-risk individuals' indifference curve lies above the low-risk in-
dividuals' indifference curve. Thus, any policy in the shaded area
between the two curves will be purchased by the low-risk individuals
in preference to the pooling contract at F,
Other such cases can be analyzed, but we trust that the general
principle is clear. Our pathological conclusions do not require that
people bave particularly good information about tbeir accident
probabilities. They will occur under a wide variety of circumstances,
including the appealing case of unbiasedness. Neither insurance firms
nor tbeir customers have to be perfectly informed about the differ-
ences in risk properties that exist among individuals: What is required
is that individuals with different risk properties differ in some char-
acteristic tbat can be linked with the purchase of insurance and that,
somehow, insurance firms discover tbis link.
II.2 Price Competition Versus Quantity Competition
One can imagine our mode! of the insurance market operating
in two distinct modes. Tbe first, price competition, is familiar to all
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Students of competitive markets. Associated witb any insurance
contract a is a number q{a) = ai/a2, whicb, since it is the cost per unit
coverage, is called the price of insurance. Under price competition,
insurance firms establish a price of insurance and allow their cus-
tomers to buy as much or as little insurance as they want at tbat price.
Thus, if contract a is available from a company, so are the contracts
2a and (Vi)"; the former pays twice as much benefits (and costs twice
as much in premiums) as a; the latter is half as expensive and provides
half as much coverage.
Opposed to price competition is what we call price and quantity
competition. In this regime companies may offer a number of different
contracts, say rt^ a'^,. . . , a". Individuals may buy at most one con-
tract. They are not allowed to buy arbitrary multiples of contracts
offered, but must instead settle for one of the contracts explicitly put
up for sale. A particular contract specifies both a price and a quantity
of insurance. Under price and quantity competition it is conceivable
that insurance contracts with different prices of insurance will exist
in equilibrium; people who want more insurance may be willing to pay
a higher price for it (accept less favorable odds) tban those who make
do witb shallower coverage. Under price competition customers will
buy insurance only at the lowest price quoted in the market.
Tbe argument of Section I depends heavily on our assumption
that price and quantity competition, and not simply price competi-
tion, characterizes the competitive insurance market. Tbis assumption
is defended here. The argument is basically quite simple. Price
competition is a special case of price and quantity competition.
Nothing in the definition of price and quantity competition prevents
firms from offering for sale a set of contracts with the same price of
insurance. Since the argument above characterized all equilibria under
price and quantity competition, it also characterized all equilibria
when some firms set prices and others set prices and quantities. Thus,
it must be tbat price competition cannot compete with price and
quantity competition.^
This argument hinges on one crucial assumption: regardless of
the form of competition, customers purchase but a single insurance
contract or equivalently that tbe total amount of insurance purchased
8. We leave to the reader a detailed proof. A sketch follows. Suppose that there
aretwogroupsin the population. Ifthepriceof insurance is q, high-and low-risk cus-
tomers will buy a"{q) and «'•((/), respectively. It is easy to figure out what total in-
surance company profits, P{q), are. The equilibrium price 17' is the smallest q sucb
that Piq) = 0. Since P(v) is continuous inq and it is easy to find q such thai P{q) >
0 and P{q) < 0, such a q* exists. To show that price competition will not survive, it Is
only necessary to sbow that («"((/*), a'-(q*)}is not an equilibrium set of contracts as
defined in subsection 1.4 above.
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by any one customer is known to all companies that sell to him. We
think that this is an accurate description of procedures on at least
some insurance markets. Many insurance policies specify either tbat
they are not in force if there is another policy or tbat tbey insure
against only the first, say, $1,000 of losses suffered. That is, instead
of being a simple bet for or against the occurrence of a particular event,
an insurance policy is a commitment on the part of tbe company to
restore at least partially the losses brought about by the occurrence
of that event. Tbe person who buys two $1,000 accident insurance
policies does not bave $2,000 worth of protection. If an accident occurs,
all he gets from his second policy is tbe privilege of watching his
companies squabble over the division of the $1,000 payment. There
is no point in buying more tban one policy.
Wby should insurance markets operate in tbis way? One simple
and obvious explanation is moral bazard. Because the insured can
often bring about, or at least make more likely, tbe event being insured
against, insurance companies want to limit the amount of insurance
their customers buy. Companies want to see that their customers do
not purchase so much insurance tbat tbey have an interest in an ac-
cident occurring. Thus, companies will want to monitor the purchases
of their customers. Issuing contracts of the sort described above is tbe
obvious way to do so.
A subtler explanation for this practice is provided by our argu-
ment tbat price and quantity competition can dominate price com-
petition. If the market is in equilibrium under price competition, a
firm can offer a contract, specifying price and quantity, that will at-
tract the low-risk customers away from the companies offering con-
tracts specifying price alone. Left with only higb-risk customers, these
firms will lose money. This competitive gambit will successfully upset
the price competition equilibria if the entering firm can be assured
that those who buy its contracts hold no other insurance. Offering
insurance that pays off only for losses not otherwise insured is a way
to guarantee this.
It is sometimes suggested tbat the term "competitive" can be
applied only to markets where there is a single price of a commodity
and each firm is a price taker. This seems an unnecessarily restrictive
use of tbe term competitive. The basic idea underlying competitive
markets involves free entry and noncollusive behavior among the
participants in the market. In some economic environments price
taking without quantity restrictions is a natural result of sucb mar-
kets. In the situations described in this paper, this is not so.
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II.3 Restrictions on Firm Behavior and Optimal Subsidies
An important simplification of the analysis of Section I was tbe
assumption tbat each insurance company issued but a single contract.
We once thought this constraint would not affect the nature of equi-
librium. We argued that in equilibrium firms must make nonnegative
profits. Suppose that a firm offers two contracts, one of which makes
an expected profit of say, $5, per contract sold, tbe other an expected
loss of $L per contract. Tbe firm can make nonnegative expected
profits if tbe ratio of the profitable to the unprofitable contracts sold
is at least n, where n = L/S. However, the firm can clearly make more
profits if it sells only tbe contracts on which it makes a profit. It and
its competitors have no reason to offer the losing contracts, and in
competitive equilibrium, they will not be offered. Since only contracts
that make nonnegative profits will be offered, it does not matter, given
our assumptions about entry, that firms are assumed to issue only a
single contract. If there is a contract that could make a profit, a firm
will offer it.
Tbis argument is not correct. The possibility of offering more
than one contract is important to firms, and to the nature and exis-
tence of equilibrium. Firms that offer several contracts are not de-
pendent on the policies offered by other firms for tbe information
generated by the choices of individuals. By offering a menu of policies,
insurance firms may be able to obtain information about tbe accident
probabilities of particular individuals. Furthermore, although there
may not be an equilibrium in wbich the profits from one contract
subsidize the losses of another contract, it does not follow that such
a pair of contracts cannot break what would otherwise be an equi-
librium.
Sucb a case is illustrated in Figure V. EF is again the market odds
line. A separating equilibrium exists (a", a'-). Suppose that a firm
offered the two contracts, a^' and a^'; a"' makes a loss, a^' makes
a profit. High-risk types prefer a^' to a'^, and low-risk types prefer
(v'-' to a^-. These two contracts, if offered by a single firm together,
do not make losses. The profits from a^' subsidize tbe losses of a'^'.
Tbus, (o;^', a'-') upsets the equilibrium (a^, d^).
This example points up another possible inefficiency of sepa-
rating equilibria. Consider the problem of choosing two contracts {a",
a'^) such tbat a'- maximizes the utility of the low-risk individual
subject to the constraints that (a) tbe high-risk individual prefers a "
to a '^ and (b) tbe pair of contracts a'^ and a^ break even when bought
by high- and low-risk types, respectively, in the ratio X to (1 - X). This




is a kind of optimal subsidy problem. If tbe separating equilibrium,
when it exists, does not solve this problem, it is inefficient. Figure V
shows that tbe separating equilibrium can be inefficient in tbis sense.
We now sbow that if there are enough higb-risk people, then tbe
separating equilibrium can be efficient.
Tbe optimal subsidy problem always has a solution {a^*, o-^ '*).
The optimal bigh-risk contract «^* will always entail complete in-
surance so that V{p", a^*) = U(W - p"d + a), where a is the per
capita subsidy of tbe high risk by the low risk. This subsidy decreases
income for each low-risk person by 7a (wbere 7 = X/(l — X)) in each
state. Net of this charge «^* breaks even when low-risk individuals
buy it. Thus, «^* = (ai + •ya,a2 - 7a), where «i = a2P^V(l - P^)-
To find the optimal contract, one solves the following problem:
Choose a and a2 to maximize
subject to
U{Y) > U{X) (1 - p
a > 0,
where
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X ~ Wo- ya - a
and
Z = WQ ~ d — ya + a2.
The solution to this problem can be analyzed by standard Kuhn-
Tucker techniques. If the constraint a > 0 is binding at the optimum,
then tbe solution involves no subsidy to the high-risk persons; (a^^*,
a^*) is the separating equilibrium. It Is straightforward but tedious
to show that a sufficient condition for this is that
(4) (p p)y^ U'iY){U'(Z) -
U'{X)U'(Z)
where X, Y, and Z are determined by the optimal a*, a2*. The
right-hand side of (4) is always less than
U'iWo-d)[U'{WQ -d)-l
so that there exist values of 7 (and thus of X) large enough to satisfy
(4).
II.4 Alternative Equilibrium Concepts
There are a number of otber concepts of equilibrium that we
might have employed. Tbese concepts differ with respect to as-
sumptions concerning the behavior of the firms in the market. In our
model the firm assumes tbat its actions do not affect the market—the
set of policies offered by other firms was independent of its own of-
fering. I
In tbis subsection we consider several other equilibrium concepts,
implying either less or more rationality in tbe market. We could, for
instance, call any set of policies that just break even given the set of
individuals who purchase them an informationally consistent equi-
librium. This assumes that the forces for tbe creation of new contracts
are relatively weak (in the absence of profits). Thus, in Figure III, a"
and any contract along the line EL below a^ is a set of informationally
consistent separating equilibrium contracts; any single contract along
the line FF is an informationally consistent pooling equilibrium
contract. This is the notion of equilibrium that Spence (1973) has
employed in most of his work. Tbe longer the lags in tbe system, the
greater tbe difficulty of competing by offering different contracts, tbe
more stable is an informationally consistent equilibrium. Thus, while
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this seems to us a reasonable equilibrium concept for tbe models of
educational signaling on whicb Spence focused, it is less compelling
when applied to insurance or credit markets (see Jaffee and Russell's
contribution to this symposium).
A local equilibrium is a set of contracts such that there do not
exist any contracts in the vicinity of the equilibrium contracts that
will be cbosen and make a positive profit. If we rule out tbe subsidies
of the last subsection, then tbe set of separating contracts, wbich
maximizes tbe welfare of low-risk individuals, is a local equilibri-
um.
The notion that firms experiment witb contracts similar to tbose
already on the market motivates the idea of a local equilibrium. Even
if firms have little knowledge about tbe shape of utility functions, and
about tbe proportions of population in different accident probabilities,
one would expect tbat competition would lead to small perturbations
around the equilibrium. A stable equilibrium requires that sucb
perturbations not lead to firms making large profits, as would be the
case with some perturbations around a pooling point.
These two concepts of equilibrium imply that firms act less ra-
tionally than we assumed tbey did in Section I. It is possible tbat firms
exhibit a greater degree of rationality; tbat is, firms ought not to take
the set of contracts offered by otber firms as given, but ought to as-
sume that otber firms will act as tbey do, or at least will respond in
some way to the new contract offered by the firm. Hence, in those
cases where in our definition tbere was no equilibrium, because for
any set of contracts there is a contract that will break even and be
chosen by a subset of tbe population, given that tbe contracts offered
by the other firms remain unchanged, those contracts that break the
equilibrium may not break even if the other firms also change their
contracts. The peculiar provision of many insurance contracts, that
the effective premium is not determined until the end of the period
(wben tbe individual obtains what is called a dividend), is perhaps
a reflection of tbe uncertainty associated with wbo will purcbase the
policy, which in turn is associated with tbe uncertainty about what
contracts otber insurance firms will offer.
Wilson (1976) introduced and analyzed one such nonmyopic
equilibrium concept. A Wilson equilibrium is a set of contracts such
that, wben customers choose among tbem so as to maximize profits,
(a) all contracts make nonnegative profits and (b) there does not exist
a new contract (orsetof contracts), whicb, if offered, makes positive
profits even when all contracts tbat lose money as a result of this entry
are withdrawn. In tbe simple model of Section I, such equilibria always
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exist. Comparing this definition with the one of subsection 1.4 above
makes it clear that, when it exists, our separating equilibrium is also
a Wilson equilibrium. When this does not exist, the Wilson equilib-
rium is the pooling contract that maximizes the utility of the low-risk
customers. This is ^ in Figure VI. fi dominates the separating pair {a'-,
a^). Consider a contract like y, wbich the low risk prefer to /3. Under
our definition of equilibrium it upsets 0. Under Wilson's it does not.
When the low risk desert 0 for y, it loses money and is withdrawn.
Then the high risk also buy 7. When both groups buy 7, it loses money.
Thus, 7 does not successfully compete against 0.
Although this equilibrium concept is appealing, it is not without
its difficulties. It seems a peculiar halfway house; firms respond to
competitive entry by dropping policies, but not by adding new policies.
Furthermore, although counterexamples are very complicated to
construct, it appears that a Wilson equihbrium may not exist if groups
differ in their attitudes towards risk. Finally, in tbe absence of col-
lusion or regulation, in a competitive insurance market, it is hard to
see how or why any single firm should take into account the conse-
quences of its offering a new policy. On balance, it seems to us tbat
nonmyopic equilibrium concepts are more appropriate for models of
monopoly (or oligopoly) than for models of competition.
FIGURE VI
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III. CONCLUSION
We began this research witb the hope of showing that even a
small amount of imperfect information could have a significant effect
on competitive markets. Our results were more striking than we bad
boped: the single price equilibrium of conventional competitive
analysis was shown to be no longer viable; market equilibrium, wben
it existed, consisted of contracts wbich specified both prices and
quantities; the bigh-risk (low ability, etc.) individuals exerted a
dissipative externality on tbe low-risk (high ability) individuals; the
structure of the equilibrium as well as its existence depended on a
number of assumptions tbat, with perfect information, were incon-
sequential; and finally, and in some ways most disturbing, under quite
plausible conditions equilibrium did not exist.
Our analysis, and our conclusions, extend beyond the simple
insurance market described above. The models of educational
screening and signaling studied by, among others. Arrow (1973), Riley
(1975), Spence (1973,1974), and Stiglitz (1971,1972,1974a, 1975b),
are obvious examples. The other papers in this symposium describe
models that can be profitably studied using our techniques and our
concepts. Models in whicb communities choose tbe level of public
goods and individuals choose among communities on the basis of tbe
menu of public goods and taxes that tbe different communities offer,
provide a less obvious but, we think, important case.'*
Do these theoretical speculations tell us anything about the real
world? In the absence of empirical work it is hard to say. The market
on which we focused most of our analysis, tbat for insurance, is
probably not competitive; whether our model may partially explain
this fact is almost impossible to say. But tbere are other markets,
particularly financial and labor markets, whicb appear to be com-
petitive and in whicb imperfect and asymmetric information play an
important role. We suspect that many of the peculiar institutions of
these labor markets arise as responses to the difficulties tbat tbey, or
any competitive market, have in handling problems of information.
Establishing (or refuting) tbis conjecture seems to provide a rich
agenda for future research.
UNIVKKSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON
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9, See F. WesthofFs dissertation (1974), and Stiglitz (1974b). A more complete
discussion of these is in our earlier working paper referred to in footnote 7 above. Salop
and Salop (1972) demonstrated, in an early draft of their symposium paper, that con-
tingent loan plans for repayment of tuition, and their possible defects, can be analyzed
along these lines.
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